

MICROSOFT ANTI-VIRUS – EXTORTION, EXPEDIENCE OR THE EXTINCTION OF THE AV INDUSTRY?

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The views and opinions presented are strictly those of the author and do not reflect the views and opinions of his employer or Virus Bulletin.

ABSTRACT

In 1993 *Microsoft* released MSDOS 6.0, which included *Microsoft Anti-Virus*, a re-branded and ill-conceived entry into the anti-virus industry. In 2003 *Microsoft* announced the acquisition of *RAV* anti-virus, and in late 2004 the acquisition of *Giant* anti-spyware.

From 2003 it was obvious that *Microsoft* would become a player in the anti-virus industry at some level. Many comments were made at the time about *Microsoft*'s previous debacle in the industry, and of course diehard *Micro*-haters cite this as a predication of the quality of the new product.

Having worked with *Microsoft* security professionals for several years, as well as with the developers of *RAV* for a couple of years prior to the acquisition, I have my own views as to the predicted performance of the offering.

This paper will take a look at the product that was acquired, the changes in the corporate culture at *Microsoft* between 1993 and today, and the effect on the product *Microsoft* is bringing to market. I left *Microsoft* in June 2005 to join *ESET*, an anti-virus company. Should I be concerned about the longevity of my job? What about the diversity of choices of anti-virus software available today – will there be any left? Will the new *Microsoft* product leave users in worse, or very little better shape than they were before, as the old *MSAV* arguably did?

INTRODUCTION

In March 1993 *Microsoft* released MSDOS® 6.0, which included utilities that had not previously been included in the operating system, one of which was *Microsoft Anti-Virus (MSAV)*. *MSAV* was a stripped down version of *Central Point Anti-Virus*, arguably a weak performer in the young anti-virus field.

In April 1993 *Microsoft* hired Randy Abrams, who promptly replaced *MSAV* internally with an anti-virus product suitable for use on the PCs in the duplication facility. The most significant problems with *MSAV* were that *Microsoft* licensed the product and so was apparently unable to improve it, and that it was very difficult to find out how to update the signatures. To add insult to injury, no significant effort was made on the part of *Microsoft* to teach users that updates were required.

As was easy to predict, *MSAV* quickly became a favourite target for virus writers, and several viruses attacked users of the product successfully. Although I am not in possession of

any statistical information, anecdotally I have been told that there was a short-term impact on the sales of anti-virus software.

Today, *Microsoft* is back in the anti-virus space. Any person who believes that the new offering from *Microsoft* will be of the same quality as *MSAV* from DOS 6 is advised to leave the room now in order to acquire an aluminum (or aluminium) foil hat. The foil hat may not help, but such people are bound to believe it does!

There is one interesting parallel between the old *MSAV* and the new product offering; both are 'bundled' as utilities. *MSAV* was not available as a product separate from DOS 6, and as of this writing, the new *Microsoft* anti-virus is available only as a suite – called *Windows Live OneCare* – which includes anti-virus, anti-spyware, a firewall, backup, hard disk defragmentation, and also offers removal of 'unnecessary files that can clog your PC'.

EXTORTION

Before continuing with my opinions of the product and predictions for the future, I would like to present the reason for the question 'Is *MSAV* extortion?', and the answer.

When *Microsoft* announced plans for a consumer anti-virus offering, some people – with an obvious and disingenuous agenda – labelled the offering 'extortion'. To answer the question of whether *MSAV* is extortion we need a functional definition of the word. Fortunately, several resources are available to help us with this task. Looking back in history the definition has not changed significantly, so those who do not know what extortion is simply lack some education. In 1913 the *Webster*'s dictionary gave the following definition [1]:

Extortion

1. The act of extorting; the act or practice of wresting anything from a person by force, by threats, or by any undue exercise of power; undue exaction; overcharge.
2. (Law) The offense committed by an officer who corruptly claims and takes, as his fee, money, or other thing of value, that is not due, or more than is due, or before it is due.

Law.com offers the following definition:

Extortion

n. obtaining money or property by threat to a victim's property or loved ones, intimidation, or false claim of a right (such as pretending to be an IRS agent). It is a felony in all states, except that a direct threat to harm the victim is usually treated as the crime of robbery. Blackmail is a form of extortion in which the threat is to expose embarrassing, damaging information to family, friends or the public.

Given the two primary definitions of extortion, we need to consider two questions:

1. Is *Microsoft* exacting payment from customers by threatening harm?
2. Is *Microsoft* overcharging?

The answer to the first question, 'Is *Microsoft* exacting payment from customers by threatening harm?' is obviously 'no'. *Microsoft* does not deliberately create security vulnerabilities to sell security software. *Microsoft* is not threatening to write viruses. There probably are very naïve or unduly paranoid people in the world who believe otherwise, but the obvious truth is no, *Microsoft* does not engage in such practices.

Is *Microsoft* overcharging for *Windows Live OneCare*? At just less than US\$50 for coverage of three computers, *Microsoft* is charging less for the *OneCare* suite than most vendors have been charging for standalone anti-virus solutions. When the entire suite of *OneCare* is considered it is obvious that *Microsoft* is not overcharging.

The only logical and honest answer to the question ‘Is *Microsoft Anti-Virus* extortion?’ is ‘no’. It is extremely disappointing that some otherwise credible reporters have abandoned journalistic integrity, adopted a self-serving agenda, and stooped well below sub-tabloid standards in referring to *Microsoft*’s re-entry into the anti-virus arena as ‘extortion’.

EXPEDIENCE

The second part of the topic involves the question of expedience. Is it expedient for *Microsoft* to provide anti-virus protection? That depends on whether we are talking about *Microsoft*, the anti-virus industry, or the users.

For *Microsoft*, this is probably an expedient move. There is a high likelihood of financial success from the endeavour and there is a significant chance that some users who do not already use anti-virus software will start to use it. It is unclear how large this number of users will be.

For the anti-virus industry, the expedience will probably depend upon the individual companies, with smaller companies potentially enjoying more success. Large companies, such as *Symantec*, *McAfee*, *Trend Micro* and *CA* will probably lose some market share to *Microsoft*. Initially the loss will be in the consumer and small business space, but when *Microsoft Forefront* comes to market, medium and large businesses are likely to be adopters at some level as well.

As far as the expedience for users goes, it is too early to provide a definitive answer. The long-term answer will depend on how well *Microsoft* anti-virus is able to help protect its customers. This speaks directly to the quality of both the product and technical support.

With the original *MSAV*, customer service was almost unheard of. This is not a situation that *Microsoft* is likely to repeat. *Microsoft* has been offering free anti-virus support for several years now, through 1-800-PCSAFETY, and has been building expertise in the field. *Microsoft*’s product support, once loathed, has made tremendous strides and is now garnering predominantly favourable feedback from consumers who use it. Technical account managers are largely very respected by the organizations they support as well. Quality service has been a serious goal of the corporation and its employees for several years.

As for the quality of the product, as of this writing it is not looking particularly good for *OneCare* users. Despite *Windows Defender* having been a released product (*Giant Anti-Spyware*), and after being acquired spending a couple of years in beta, anti-spyware is not installed by default in *OneCare* and has no *Checkmark* certification for spyware detection. Several anti-virus companies were able to integrate spyware detection into their product and achieve spyware detection certification much more quickly than this.

On 16 June 2006, a zero-day vulnerability in *Excel* was disclosed. On 18 June, *OneCare* was unable to detect one of two exploit samples where seven other anti-virus companies were already protecting their users.

Still, I do expect the quality of *Microsoft*’s offering to improve. To understand why I expect the quality of the product and support to be competitive it is useful to have a glimpse into the *Microsoft* ‘psyche’. Having worked at *Microsoft* for over a dozen years, I feel qualified to help provide some insight.

John Thompson, CEO of *Symantec* (apparently a Larry Ellison wannabe) was quoted by *ZDNet* in May 2006 as saying: ‘Our strategy is to out-innovate *Microsoft*. We know more about security than they ever will.’ [2]

I have news for Mr Thompson: *Symantec* doesn’t know anything about security – in fact, no company does. A company is a legal entity and it is the *people* who hold the knowledge. *Microsoft* has people who are every bit the equals of security experts in any other company.

The strategy of *Symantec* out-innovating *Microsoft* does not appear to be rooted in *Symantec*’s corporate history. *Symantec* has not yet been able to keep pace with the technical innovations of small companies like *ESET*, *Norman* and *BitDefender*.

Perhaps I misinterpreted the word ‘innovate’, though. *Symantec* bought *Norton* anti-virus and the *IBM* ‘Digital Immune System’. *Symantec* bought *IMLogic* to protect IM systems. *Symantec* bought *Sygate* and *Safeweb*, and a host of other companies. *Microsoft* is well versed in acquisitions as well. Despite the ability to buy technology there has been no demonstrable ability for either *Microsoft* or *Symantec* to detect malicious software proactively at any significant rate. The prevention, rather than clean up, of infections is where innovation is most sorely needed.

It is the people at *Microsoft* who will determine the quality of the product and the support. *Microsoft Corporation* employs in excess of 50,000 employees. Like any large corporation, *Microsoft* has some bad apples, but the vast majority of employees are smart, hard-working individuals who take pride in their work. Most employees are front-line product support for their friends and families. It is embarrassing to these people when there are problems with *Microsoft* products. *Microsoft* employees generally are very passionate about the work they do. The love of technology has resulted in some really cool, but insecure products in the past, but with security at the forefront now – especially being forced down marketing’s proverbial throat – these people are working on developing new technologies with security in mind.

Obviously there have been numerous problems with the security of *Microsoft*’s products in the past, however it is doubtful that many, if any, other products could withstand the scrutiny that *Microsoft* products receive and come out faring any better while providing anything close to comparable functionality and ease of use.

Microsoft nurtures a tremendous culture that encourages respectful disagreement. Within the company there are a myriad of mailing lists that deal with a variety of topics. One such mailing list that deals with information for testers is virtually an online classroom and support centre. Even though my job title and background were not in testing (at least not formally), I joined the testing information mailing list. The sharing of information on that list enhanced the knowledge of all who participated.

This type of knowledge sharing is a huge and valuable resource for *Microsoft* and results in improved product and

employee productivity. One need not be a tester to participate in the list and people from a variety of job functions make meaningful contributions to the list.

A different list dealing with product security and security and privacy issues in general is not only a source of information and education, but a lively forum where many diverse viewpoints and opinions on these issues are argued.

Vehement disagreement with *Microsoft* policies and plans were, and I suspect still are, commonplace on this list. Anyone who has participated on this list must understand how far the *Microsoft* environment is from an ideological monoculture. *Microsoft*'s executive management is intelligent enough to understand that disagreement with policies and decision is not disloyal, rather it demonstrates passion and genuine caring. *Microsoft*'s management is also smart enough to know it is better to be aware of what people think than to participate in stifling dissent.

Once, while working at *Microsoft*, I obtained potential vulnerability information that I passed along to the *Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC)*. The reply I received stated that the issue was not a vulnerability. Convinced that it was, I provided arguments and a harmless example of the problem to demonstrate my reasoning. After ensuing discussions, internal to the *MSRC*, it was decided that the issues did either constitute a vulnerability or at least a problem that required resolution. The problem was later fixed. I was not a tester, a programmer, a member of a security team, or in any position of authority. Security response was not my job. At no time (that I am aware of) was I criticized for intruding into someone else's job, nor were my views and opinions dismissed as irrelevant due to my background or job duties.

The fact that people at *Microsoft* are willing to accept information and diverse views, generally very openly, is a huge benefit to the company. *Microsoft* employees are encouraged to contribute their skills, knowledge and opinions on any issue they feel passionate about. Companies who do not actively foster this type of environment waste valuable resources and put themselves at a serious competitive disadvantage to *Microsoft*.

For those interested in another employee's insight into what it is like to work at *Microsoft*, I would refer them to [3].

The combination of the work environment, the dedication of employees, and the hiring of experienced anti-virus professionals leave me with no doubt that *Microsoft* will be a serious contender based upon the merits of its product.

After *Microsoft* announced that it had acquired *GeCad RAV*, Nick FitzGerald posted thoughts about the acquisition on alt.comp.virus. In June 2003, when discussing why *Microsoft* had made this decision, Nick posted:

'What can MS really hope to benefit from acquiring some pretty good (cross platform) AV s/w?

'The cynic in me (and no disrespect to the RAV folk, past and present and the soon-to-be MSAV 2.0 folk) says that those foolish enough to sign up for MSAV 2.0 will mainly be fuelling *Microsoft*'s need to get users "hooked" into an "always on" (well, "very often connected") drop feed from MS for their AV definition updates. Perhaps to sweeten the deal, at least at first, MS may offer its AV updates free (or heavily discounted) through WindowsUpdate.

'You see where I'm going with this?

'Having a steady supply of users connecting to the Redmond mother ship every day for what has come (due to the AV industry's "success") to be seen as "needed updates" may boost either or both of MS's desires for pushing more patches to more users (who may normally be rather hesitant, if not outright resistant to visit WindowsUpdate) and/or as the "natural" means to start a "paid for updates" service. Not only has the AV industry enjoyed unparalleled access to its users' computers to install updates almost unquestioned, _but_ its users enjoy this so much they _pay_ for the "privilege".

'MS has never come close to this level of user "dedication", and may now see this as the route forward for increasing "revenue opportunities".'

I was not involved in the decision-making process to acquire *RAV*, but having had discussions with people who were involved, at some level, I believe that Nick is partially on the right track. In a paper by Matthew Braverman entitled 'Win32/Blaster: a case study from *Microsoft*'s perspective' and presented at VB2005 [4], it was reported that more than five months after the Blaster worm had appeared the *Windows Blaster Worm Removal Tool* cleaned millions of infected computers. Later in Matthew Braverman's paper it is revealed that, within six months, over 12 million computers were disinfected.

Microsoft realizes that the exploitation of security problems, as well as malware infections that only rely upon user ignorance and gullibility, are harming the *Windows* brand. By attracting users to *Windows Update*, and by getting users to run anti-virus software, *Microsoft* will improve the security of its users. This will help *Microsoft* protect the *Windows* brand. The corporate focus on protecting the *Windows* brand is another reason why I expect both product support and the product itself to be of good quality. From the human side, the testers, developers, and support professionals at *Microsoft* do sincerely want to help people be more secure. I do not believe that the revenue potential will go unexploited, and I do not believe this was a primary factor in the decision to provide a *Microsoft* solution.

After the *Microsoft Blaster Removal* tool, *Microsoft* released the *Microsoft Malicious Software Removal* tool. Some statistics around the success of the latter were presented by Jason Garms at the AVAR 2005 conference in Tianjin, China [5]. The billions of executions to date, coupled with a very low incidence of problems with the tool bode well for *Microsoft*, however it must be noted that there are considerable differences between a fully-fledged anti-virus product and a monthly tool that addresses a small part of the problem. Still, one must recognize the capability of *Microsoft* engineers to produce a robust security tool.

It would appear from empirical evidence that *Windows Live OneCare* will be expedient for some users. The major caveat would be that if a user selects *Windows Live OneCare* over discrete security products providing better protection, the specific user's security profile will be degraded. For those using inferior products, or none at all, *OneCare* is good news.

Obviously a big part of the quality of the offering is the technology. As Nick FitzGerald noted, *Microsoft* acquired some 'pretty good' anti-virus software. While *RAV* posted a cumulative record six VB 100% awards out of 25 attempts, it should be noted that *RAV* achieved VB 100% awards in four of its last six tests and one of the failures was on the *Linux*

OS. *RAV* was a product with an increasing level of quality and very bright developers. Several of these developers came to *Microsoft* in the acquisition of *RAV*. Unlike the days of DOS 6, *Microsoft* has a significant and competent test and development team working on the anti-virus product.

Microsoft invests billions of dollars each year in its research department. The funding is for pure research, much like *Park Xerox* used to do. I would expect that some of the ideas coming from *Microsoft* research will eventually add significant heuristic capabilities to the product; however that is far from guaranteed. Companies such as *McAfee* and *Symantec* have significantly greater resources, but have been unable to approach the heuristic capabilities of *NOD32* – the product of *ESET*, a small Slovakian company – or *Norman Virus Control* from Norwegian company *Norman*, or *BitDefender* from Romanian company *SOFTWIN*.

EXTINCTION OF THE AV INDUSTRY?

So, given that *Microsoft* is not extorting users, and will very likely have a very competitive product soon, if not already, what does this mean to the anti-virus industry? Will we see another *IE* vs. *Netscape* scenario? Leave it to Nick FitzGerald to provide some prescient insight into this topic in the same 2003 alt.comp.virus post.

‘And does MS really think it can (in the short term) take over enough of the AV industry to dominate? Remember, in the “browser wars” against Netscape, it was really two _emerging_ products fighting not only for market share but to shape the vision and direction of what that market was. Here we have MS swallowing up a small player in a very well-established sub-industry niche – quite a different kettle of fish if you ask me...’

Before this alt.comp.virus thread *ZDNet* ran an interview with Bill Gates [6], in which David Coursey reported the following:

‘When asked why Microsoft isn’t in the anti-virus business and more heavily into desktop security, to my surprise Gates just sort of smiled and said some issues remain to be resolved. I think companies in those spaces should consider that a warning.’

In an email to a private mailing list (quoted with permission) Jimmy Kuo addressed the notion of the warning with the following quip:

‘I’ll consider it a warning when MS actually does it.
Because that’ll be two tries.
And MS succeeds on its third try.
:-)’

Perhaps *Windows Defender* or the *Microsoft Malicious Software Removal Tool* represents the second try. I believe that *OneCare* will make a significant impact in the anti-virus industry, but predominantly for the largest players.

To quote yet more of Nick FitzGerald’s alt.com.virus post from 2003:

‘...there’s the existing, very well-established “should I use McAfee or Norton?” mindset in that market sector.’

Unlike Nick, I believe that the *McAfee* and *Norton* consumer market is where *Microsoft* will have a very significant impact. With no disrespect intended to the large players in the

industry, I do believe that most of the consumers buying these products do so primarily due to name recognition and marketing. These people generally have neither the skills, nor often the desire, to truly evaluate anti-virus software.

Microsoft carries tremendous name recognition and a world-class marketing organization. It may take some time, but I would expect the detection capabilities of *Microsoft*’s offering eventually to match *Symantec*, and there is significant potential for better heuristics. If the incredibly slow nature of *Symantec*’s anti-virus offering is key to its market dominance then *Microsoft* will be unbeatable – in *Virus Bulletin* testing, *OneCare* is making *Symantec* look fast! *McAfee* and *Trend Micro* will also face a competitor who is their equal or better in marketing prowess and a product that is, or will be, their equal or potentially better as well.

Of course, the companies with the largest market share have the most market share to lose. However, I believe the largest companies will lose a disproportionately high share of consumers initially. I think the smaller companies will see a significantly lower rate of loss of market share. Small companies like *ESET*, and several others, have customers who already know the names of *McAfee*, *Symantec* and *Trend Micro*. These customers have already been exposed to the marketing machines of these companies, and yet have made a conscious decision to choose the products they use for reasons that clearly extend beyond name recognition. In general, *ESET*’s customers care about system resource consumption and proactive detection. *Microsoft*’s offering includes separate engines for anti-virus and anti-spyware and then adds other components. No data, as of this writing, indicates any significant level of heuristics in the *Microsoft* offering and the scanner is considerably slower than most other anti-virus products.

The one reason why *Microsoft* may have success in luring customers from smaller companies is the convenience factor of the backup and performance portions of *OneCare*. This may not prove to be as enticing as it may look at first glance. For customers choosing solutions based upon technology it is reasonable to assume that a significant percentage of these customers also have a favourite backup solution and/or performance product. *OneCare* will not appeal to the ‘best-of-breed’ buyer in the foreseeable future.

Microsoft will have obstacles to overcome if it is to obtain and maintain significant market share. Not the least of these factors is a hostile media. When a *Microsoft* product has a fairly low risk vulnerability, the press reports this to a far greater extent than when any other company’s products have more significant problems. Anything negative with *Microsoft*’s name in the headlines is seen as a marketing opportunity for many media companies. I’m betting it is effective in bringing attendees to a presentation too! A virus that disables *Microsoft Anti-Virus* as well as a dozen other anti-virus products will be presented as attacking *Microsoft*. While the negative treatment of *Microsoft* by the media may be disproportionate, often inaccurate, and unfair, it does happen and it will have some impact on *MS*.

Microsoft Anti-Virus will be the target of most all of the virus writers. In the past this may have diverted some attacks away from other vendors, but the evolution of malware toward organized crime simply means that *Microsoft* will be an additional target. It is unlikely that any other vendors will see any reduction in attacks against their products with *Microsoft*

entering the field. Having said that, it is still likely that the fewer, but still active, non-profit malware writers will target *MSAV* specifically for fun or out of spite, and most other vendors will be ignored. The result will be a marginally higher attack rate against *Microsoft*.

In the past, it was other vendors' anti-virus products that failed to prevent *Windows* from becoming infected. The fact that *Microsoft's* anti-virus offering will, at times, fail means that it will be *Microsoft* who failed to protect *Windows*. I believe that after some market gain by *Microsoft*, failure to protect its own operating system will eventually cause many users to turn to other anti-virus solutions, restoring some lost market share for other companies. The fact that other companies' products fail, at times, to protect the *Microsoft* operating systems will generally not be viewed as harshly as when *OneCare* fails, regardless of which product does better overall.

The most obvious hurdle and perhaps the largest for *Microsoft* is the perception of not understanding security. Regardless of truth or fairness of this perception, it will slow the rate of adoption of *OneCare* and will prevent many from ever adopting the *Microsoft* offering.

One of the concerns I have heard in the anti-virus industry is how *Microsoft* being a competitor is going to affect the sharing of information. In 1997 *Microsoft* was exceptionally bad at sharing information that would help the anti-virus industry protect *Microsoft* users. Over time, *Microsoft* became better at sharing information. A handful of people at *Microsoft* worked very hard to make this happen. The group at *Microsoft* that is responsible for sharing information with the industry is now the group responsible for the security product offerings – an apparent conflict of interest.

Interestingly, this unholy alliance may potentially result in better information sharing than if the duties were separated. Any information that the *Microsoft* anti-virus product group has about *Microsoft* software will probably have to be shared in order to prevent legal problems. Because *Microsoft* is now producing anti-virus software, there will be people in *Microsoft* requiring the same information that the rest of the anti-virus industry needs. I do not see the competitive aspect as a reason for information sharing to be diminished.

If less information is shared I would expect it to be due to the lack of industry experience of the anti-virus product management at *Microsoft*. Few people at *Microsoft* have any significant experience working with the anti-virus industry. I also believe that experienced researchers, such as Adrian Marinescu, have the stature and integrity to insist that *Microsoft* play fairly with the rest of the industry.

The better *Microsoft's* competitors are at protecting *Windows* users, the stronger the *Windows* brand will be. This should be exceptionally strong motivation for *Microsoft* to help the industry as much as possible. A possible problem in acting on this self-serving, but useful motivation is a review system that probably does not take this aspect of the business into consideration.

The absolute numbers of users signed up for *OneCare* will probably be the review criteria for employees and the absolute good done for the *Windows* brand name will probably not carry any weight at employee review time. If *Microsoft* can figure out how to address this potential problem the industry stands to benefit from increasingly better information sharing.

If *Microsoft* is unable to reward performance that leads to a stronger *Windows* brand then the industry will struggle for critical information and *OneCare* will prove to be counterproductive to *Microsoft* and its customers.

One of the issues I have with *Microsoft's* entry into the anti-virus/anti-spyware arena is the blatant corporate hypocrisy of the corporation's pro-spam and anti-privacy position.

On the surface, Bill Gates and the *Microsoft* public voice claim to be fighting against spam. The truth is that *Microsoft*, as a corporation, has supported legislation that allows spam to be sent to users who do not opt out, as opposed to the respectful approach of opt in. Anti-malware professionals know that, increasingly, spam is used to carry malware. The notion that one should opt out of spam is inconsistent with respect for privacy, and flies in the face of intelligent security measures. I would expect that if a survey was conducted amongst *Microsoft* employees the vast majority would prefer opt-in legislation in the US, yet *Microsoft Corporation* has completely ignored anything related to decency in its approach to this issue.

I doubt this will have any significant effect on US sales, but I would hope that in other parts of the world, where laws are more supportive of privacy than those in the US, it will be detrimental to sales. It is irresponsible for *Microsoft* to support a position that requires consumers to validate their email address for spammers in order to try to be removed from a spam list. *Microsoft's* opt-out position contributes to the spam problem, and hence to the spread of malware. There is little wonder why the US is one of the biggest spam producers – companies such as *Microsoft* have openly supported legislation to exacerbate the problem.

The final obstacle for *Microsoft* is its track record. *Microsoft* anti-virus does not have any significant track record and *Microsoft Defender*® has not achieved any certification for spyware detection as of this writing.

The competition has established track records. Many other companies have long histories of consistent certification by the *ICSA*, *Checkmark*, and *Virus Bulletin*. *NOD32* is certified by *Checkmark Labs*, *ICSA*, and has achieved the *Virus Bulletin* VB 100% award more times than any other product. *NOD32* has been tested by *AV-Test.org* and *AV-Comparatives.org* and has consistently been found to have exceptionally better proactive detection than any other product, including products developed by companies, such as *Microsoft*, with large research and development budgets.

There is a simple measure for *Microsoft* if they care to try to compete on the technical merits of their product. *ESET* has set the bar for quality, it remains to be seen how high *Microsoft* can jump.

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